By Leigh Catherine Miles
Editor, Iran Election Bulletin
Dear Reader,
The Guardian Council announced this week the slate of candidates who will be allowed to compete in the June 12 presidential polls. Of the 475 who registered, only the four who have captured the election spotlight were approved – incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, fellow conservative Mohsen Rezai and reformists Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi.
Despite initial signals that the Guardian Council might at last approve the first woman candidate, none of the 42 women who registered was allowed to compete. While still effectively barred from the presidency, women have emerged as key players in the current contest. Candidates are reaching out to women voters with pledges to appoint women to senior administration positions and address women’s rights. Mousavi’s wife has taken an unprecedented role in his campaign, giving policy speeches and attending rallies side-by-side with her husband. And at least one candidate is even accused of trying to buy women’s votes through distribution of food vouchers and other largess.
Youth and ethnic minorities have received similar attention from the candidates. All four have made tours through Iran’s provinces and spoken to youth and student groups, highlighting their proposed policies to address each group’s respective concerns. While candidates have played to women, youth and minorities in the past, the level of outreach has been elevated in this campaign season – an indication that the candidates view this election as highly competitive.
High voter turnout might force a second round vote – though who the current front runner is, and by how much, is still anyone’s guess. Candidates and their associated media outlets are putting out their own polls, but thus far no credible independent polling has been released.
This issue of the Iran Election Bulletin looks at the voting demographics of women, youth and ethnic minorities. While any one of these groups might not be able to shift the outcome of the election, collectively they have the potential to wield significant electoral influence.
I hope you enjoy reading this edition and welcome you to email me [2] with questions or comments.
Sincerely,
Leigh Catherine Miles
Editor
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Published on May 21, 2009
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By Geneive Abdo
Iran Analyst, The Century Foundation
In the final days before Iran’s June 12 presidential election, the leading contenders are using a mix of old and new campaign techniques, including social networking sites like Facebook, to win over a powerful but elusive constituency – the country’s university students.
University campuses have played a vital role in revolutionary politics in Iran. Students are feared among Iran’s ruling political elites; they actively participate in elections and their influence extends beyond their generation. In 1979, students were instrumental in ousting the Shah during the Islamic revolution. During the “Tehran Spring,” from 1997-1999, student leaders helped bring former President Mohammed Khatami and the reform movement to power and then tried, unsuccessfully, to ring in a new era of democracy by staging widespread riots throughout Iran.
In 2005, to show their opposition to then-candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the students launched an effective election boycott and voter turnout was low, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the election. Since Ahmadinejad’s victory, the declared objective of the Office to Consolidate Unity (Daftar-e-Takhim-e-Vahdat), an umbrella group that leads an amorphous national student movement, is to spread their ideas beyond their campuses into mainstream Iranian society. Like Iranians of all ages, the students favor less state interference in their lives, a more democratic political system, and an end to widespread human rights violations.
For these reasons, the candidates in the upcoming June 12 presidential poll are competing for the support of young voters. As with past elections, university campuses have become key battlegrounds for debating the country’s political future. In fact, since campaigning began in the spring, Iran’s conservative leadership on occasion has banned reformist candidates from making speeches at universities and forced them to either cancel the events or address students from the streets outside the campuses. Reformists have accused the authorities of hindering their efforts to rally student support.
The three main rivals to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are seizing upon the opportunity to distinguish themselves from the Iranian president, who students believe is largely responsible for a crackdown on social freedom. Iran’s young generation also blames the president for high unemployment among youth and Iran’s negative image in the West.
Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the reformist who stands the best chance of gaining student support, has campaigned at dozens of university campuses across the country before enthusiastic crowds. His candid speeches, modest appearance, and years as an artist have gained the trust of young voters. One of his main messages targeted toward youth is that he is concerned about the restrictions on social freedom and the violations of civil liberties. Mousavi has used several gimmicks to win support, including likening his wife, Zahra Rahnavard, to U.S. First Lady Michelle Obama.
Before thousands of students at Ferdowsi University in Mashhad on April 23, Mousavi said: “It is not clear why we look at universities and students as a security risk … A number of our students are in prison.” His comments were a direct criticism of President Ahmadinejad’s policies, which have led to the widespread imprisonment of Iranian activists, including students. “I am against political arrests and consider them against the interests of the country,” he said.
Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, the other reformist presidential contender, are struggling to compete with Ahmadinejad’s vast government resources, which include daily access to the state monopoly on radio and television programming. Even though by law all presidential candidates are officially allowed access to the state-controlled media, it is severely limited. For example, Tehran’s notorious Prosecutor General, Saeed Mortazavi, closed the reformist-leaning newspaper Yas-e-Now in mid-May, after the paper published a headline, “Khatami, Mousavi for Iran,” with a large photograph of the two men standing among their supporters.
Mousavi is appealing to the technology-savvy youth, who have access to email and cell phones. Two-thirds of Iranians have mobile phones, 21 million have access to the internet, and 60 per cent of Iran’s 70 million people are under the age of 30. According to the World Bank, approximately 12.4 million eligible voters – roughly 27 percent of the electorate – are between the ages of 20 and 29.
Mousavi’s campaign is capitalizing on the popularity of Facebook, YouTube and Twitter to create grassroots support for his candidacy. New media is being used by other candidates as well, including Ahmadinejad and Karroubi. In early May, Mousavi opened about 20 Facebook pages, which attracted 7,500 members. Facebook is being employed particularly among those working to defeat Ahmadinejad in his bid for re-election. One page called “I bet I can find 1,000,000 people who dislike Mahmoud Ahmadinejad” has attracted more than 35,000 members – a considerable number, if still well short of its own goal.
Mousavi’s supporters are also using blogs as a platform to communicate directly with young voters and inform them of the candidate’s ideas and campaign activities. Massoumeh Ebtekar, the well-known spokeswoman for the Iranian hostage-takers in 1979 and later the country’s first woman vice president under Khatami, has created the blog “Persian Paradox.” In one entry, she writes about her latest campaign stop to gain support for Mousavi. “I spoke at a University in Qom last night. There were about 300 students and the topic of the meeting was: Why Mousavi? Supporters of the current government criticized reformist policies. I replied patiently … Mousavi has spoken clearly in support of individual freedoms, the rule of law, women’s rights, the need for economic and political reform and many other issues … The campaign is gaining momentum and young people are fervently engaged.”
Mohsen Rezai, the former Revolutionary Guards Commander who is another leading presidential candidate, has also reached out to students. At campaign stops at universities in recent days, he has criticized Ahmadinejad, a fellow conservative who is his main rival on the right. He also has used his appearances to win support for the coalition government of conservatives and reformists he hopes to form if he is elected. At Sharif University, Rezai appealed to the youth’s interest in a less conservative government, particularly one that is tolerant of Iran’s diverse population. “We will form an efficient coalition government and coalition among ethnicities is our goal,” he told students at Sharif University. “I love Iran and do not consider discrimination among ethnicities to benefit the country.”
For his part, the incumbent Ahmadinejad, who is also using Facebook in his campaign but whose visits with students are less frequent than the other candidates, is employing a strategy common among Iran’s conservative leaders. He has organized buses to transport students, government workers and soldiers to attend his public appearances in order to swell the numbers in the audience. The reform movement, including Mousavi, has criticized this strategy, which sparked a national debate in early May, after a student was killed in a bus crash as he was transferred from the southern town of Farsa to Shiraz to attend a speech given by Ahmadinejad. “Closing down schools and departments and forcing students, clerks and soldiers to attend a welcome ceremony for government officials is nothing new but at what price?” asked the reformist daily newspaper Etemad-e-Melli on May 2.
In the last several elections, student leaders have expressed frustration at Iran’s murky electoral system, which allows for considerable interference by conservative clerics and generally lacks transparency. Iran’s main student opposition group, the Office to Consolidate Unity, stated in parliamentary elections in 2006 that neither participation nor a boycott would make any real difference to the nation’s political course.
This sentiment is also shared among student leaders this election. They have made it clear that they no longer have enormous faith in the reformists, as they did when they fervently supported Khatami. Students have become disillusioned; they have realized since Khatami’s presidency from 1997 through 2005 that it will take far more than their votes – such as revising the constitution – to fundamentally change Iran’s political system. Although they appear to favor Mousavi over the other candidates, they also have stated that no faction – reformist or otherwise – should count on their vote. In January 2008, Mehdi Arabshahi, a leader in the Office to Consolidate Unity, said the organization would not repeat its past mistakes by viewing elections as “a remedy for all the nation’s troubles.”
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Published on May 21, 2009
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By Ali Afshari
Former Member of the Central Council of the Office for Consolidation of Unity; Iranian Affairs Expert
The Iranian presidential election has become the focus of the nation, with observers – both in Iran and abroad – watching closely to see whether President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will be re-elected or whether there will be a change of government. Amid this atmosphere, the election has found a unique place in universities, which are considered the main venues for reform in Iran. Students, as essential drivers of change, view the upcoming election as an opportunity to improve their current conditions. Unlike previous elections, the student movement has a more positive and pragmatic approach in the lead up to the June 12 polls, with the majority opting to participate actively. Having said that, Iran’s student body – as a whole – is still hopelessly ambivalent towards the election.
Student movements in Iran can basically be categorized into four groups. The first group consists of advocates for democracy – namely the Office for Consolidating Unity (Tahkeem’eh Vahdat) and the Students’ Islamic Associations – who represent the largest dissident student population in the country. This group, which participated in election boycotts previously, is interested in taking part in the 2009 presidential election. The Students’ Islamic Associations of 50 universities point to the poor record of the Ahmadinejad administration in education and the economy, as well as other failures in social and cultural fronts, and are asking the nation to reject him. The movement views reform as the pivotal path toward democracy, but does not necessarily believe that this election will result in an administration with the capacity or ability to implement a wide-ranging reform agenda. At the same time, the group believes that more moderate members of the regime holding executive positions would provide a more fertile ground for the peaceful transition of Iran to a civil and democratic society.
While the group has aligned itself with the reformist candidates, it has not yet decided whether to support Mir-Hossein Mousavi or Mehdi Karroubi. Following its general assembly meeting, Tahkeem’eh Vahdat wrote a letter to the reformist candidates asking them to explain their positions on students’ demands. The group’s endorsement will be based upon its assessment of each candidate’s response and his plan to address student concerns; it is anticipated that Karroubi is more likely to win the students’ votes and support. Some of the highlights of students’ demands include:
The abolition of quotas regarding sex and locality for entrance to all state universities.
Review and reconsideration of all disciplinary verdicts rendered to students during the last four years and reinstating of expelled students, with proper conditions for their return to classes.
Reconsideration in the status of all student organizations that were shut down in the last few years and an emphasis on the right of dissent.
Serious review and modification of the disciplinary articles of students associations, unions, publications under the advice of the faculty and student activists.
Review and reconsideration of the status of the entire faculty who have been expelled, or forced to retire, and the need to hire only qualified teachers and professors.
The election of university presidents by vote of committees comprised of students, professors, and other university employees.
The second group within the student movement is the progressive Islamists who are moderates and usually support reformist and religious nationalists. Members of this group are typically members of the students’ branches of political parties, such as the Freedom Movement (Nehzat Azadi) and the Islamic Iran Participation Front (Hezbe Mosharekat), and they consistently encourage youth to vote. During this election, this group supports Mousavi, who it views as the candidate for positive change and social improvements.
The third group consists of leftists who are known for their struggle for equal rights and liberty. Most have Marxist-Leninist tendencies. Following a rapid growth in numbers in the last several years, lately their numbers have drastically declined. The leftists have been silent about the election, and so far, have not endorsed anyone.
Pro-government students form the last student movement group. Members of this group are characterized by absolute support for the Supreme Leader and the regime leadership; deep belief in the theocracy; anti-Western views; traditional social values; and a lack of support for democracy. The Paramilitary Students (Basij Daneshjooyi) and the Islamic Society of Students (Jameh Islami Daneshjooyan) are the two main factions that make up this group. The Student Basij shares offices and structures with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which openly supports Ahmadinejad. They consider his reelection a reinforcement of revolutionary values and Islam, and a defeat for foreign enemies, especially the United States.
The Islamic Society of Students and the Islamic Coalition Party (Jamiate Moatalefeh Islami) are strategically united, and they both strongly support the conservative camp. The Islamic Society of Students, in line with its allies, has thrown its support behind Ahmadinejad, who it views as following the Supreme Leader’s school of thought and as having done more for the poor than other governments before his.
One needs to wait until the very last days before the election to predict which candidate is most likely to win the votes of the Iranian electorate as a whole. But a close look at the student movements reveals where their votes will go: Mousavi will receive the highest number of student votes, followed by Ahmadinejad, Karroubi, and finally, conservative candidate Mohsen Rezai.
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Published on May 21, 2009
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By Kaveh-Cyrus Sanandaji
Middle East Center, St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford
As the Iranian presidential election rapidly approaches, the frontrunners – incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mohsen Rezai, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi – are tirelessly campaigning across the country. Reformists Mousavi and Karroubi, in particular, are competing intensely for support among Iran’s large, but often neglected, ethnic and religious minority voting blocs. Although Karroubi initially received the endorsement of several minority groups, the tide has turned in favor of Mousavi in recent weeks as his extensive campaigning appears to have demonstrated a sincere empathy for the welfare of these groups.
Iran is an ethnically and religiously diverse country, but its diversity has been subverted repeatedly by the state as a means both to present and preserve national unity. Iran’s leaders, both during the Pahlavi dynasty and later following the Islamic revolution, have long feared that minorities, predominantly located in the peripheral provinces, pose a threat to national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Past attempts to reassert ethno-linguistic identity through local dress or language have been opposed as explicit efforts to undermine the state. Although these groups—including, among others, Arabs, Kurds, Baluchis, Turkmen, Azeris and Lurs—comprise roughly half of Iran’s population, their local needs have been overlooked by successive governments.
Mohammad Khatami’s landslide presidential victory in 1997 and the corresponding rise of the reform movement offered peripheral ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious minorities the promise of greater regional autonomy and more equitable rights, such as the freedoms of expression and association. Though the establishment of local councils was included in Article 7 of the 1989 constitution, it was only during Khatami’s presidency that this measure was enforced. In 1999, newly-formed elected provincial, city, district and village councils were charged with addressing the day-to-day welfare needs of their respective constituencies, effectively affording peripheral minorities more control over their local and regional affairs.
Not until the 2005 presidential election, however, did candidates begin to address openly the needs of ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious minorities in national arenas. In particular, Mostafa Moin and Karroubi repeatedly made statements promising to respect equal rights, incorporate more ethnic minorities in government positions and increase the quality of non-Persian television and radio broadcasts. Although reformists Moin, Mohsen Mehralizadeh and Karroubi received a combined majority of votes in Western and Eastern Azerbaijan, Golestan, Hormozgan, Ilam, Kermanshah, Kurdestan, Lurestan and Sistan/Baluchestan, none was able individually to secure enough votes to proceed to the second round of elections, which Ahmadinejad ultimately won.
Since becoming president in 2005, Ahmadinejad’s emphasis on renewing early revolutionary ideology has led to the subversion of regional identities in favor of a unified revolutionary, Islamic identity. Tehran’s reluctance to continue granting regional autonomy, while attributable to several factors, is most likely a result of the state’s framing of the minority question in security terms. Despite Ahmadinejad’s much publicized provincial tours, he has prioritized efforts to repress “domestic terrorists” over addressing regional needs. Heightened Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) activity in the peripheral areas, particularly in the South-Eastern region dominated by Baluchis, has dove-tailed with the abrogation of local council authorities, provoking a backlash against the state – including a rising number of mass protests and violent attacks against IRGC installations and oil pipelines – which threatens regime stability.
The resurgence in minority grievances has recently brought ethnic politics to the fore with an unprecedented sense of urgency, and the regime has taken steps to assuage perceptions of disenfranchisement or repression shared by ethnic minorities. For example, in a recent trip to Sanandaj, the capital of Kurdistan province, Mehr News published photos of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei inspecting troops at an IRGC base – striking only because several units donned traditional Kurdish garb. During this same trip, Khamenei met with local leaders to hear their grievances and called for renewed investments to develop Kurdistan’s limited infrastructure. Though anecdotal, these actions indicate a shift in the regime’s approach toward ethnic minority rights and the improvement of their conditions.
The discourse on ethnic politics has also drastically expanded during the 2009 presidential campaigns. Mousavi in particular has been campaigning in the minority-dominated provinces of Azerbaijan, Khuzestan, Kermanshah, Mazandaran and Golestan, among others. Beyond the standard assurances of greater minority incorporation in government and promises to respect minority rights, which are echoed by Karroubi and Rezai, Mousavi has proposed unprecedented, detailed policies to address minority grievances.
At numerous campaign rallies and in discussions with ethnic and religious minority leaders, Mousavi has criticized Ahmadinejad’s administration. Stating that Iran’s diversity should be embraced, Mousavi declared that, “throughout history, Iran’s minorities have lived in peaceful coexistence, so we should not deal with them as a security problem.” Moreover, citing Article 19 of the constitution – which emphasizes the equal value of human beings regardless of religion or ethnicity – Mousavi has stated he does not believe there should be any special limitations on minorities in the Islamic Republic.
In addition to campaign rhetoric, public demonstrations of respect for and dedication to minority groups have distinguished Mousavi from his rivals. Aftab News reported that during a trip to Kermanshah, Mousavi, who is a devout Shi’a, not only prayed in a Sunni mosque but also followed a Sunni Imam to demonstrate his respect for Sunnis. In a conversation with Molavi Abdol-Hamid – one of the spiritual leaders of the Sunni community in Iran – Mousavi also promised to prepare a national plan to address and resolve the Sunni community’s numerous grievances, including constructing the first Sunni mosque in Tehran.
Mousavi has also reached out to ethno-linguistic minorities. At a recent rally in Azerbaijan, he stated that in return for committing to the revolution many years ago, the government must show more sensitivity to the local needs of ethnic Azeris. Moreover, Mousavi, who is an ethnic Azeri himself, declared “I am the son of Azerbaijan” to cheering crowds at a campaign rally in which he reportedly delivered his entire speech in Azeri Turkish. In a state whose official language is Persian, it is almost unheard of for a national politician to speak in another language in a public forum.
Past studies of voting behavior in Iran suggest the peripheral minorities are most likely to vote for one of the reformist candidates – Karroubi or Mousavi. These voters respond not only to ethnic ties, but also to active campaigning. So although Karroubi, an ethnic Lur, will likely carry Lorestan and Mousavi, an ethnic Azeri, will likely carry East and West Azerbaijan, the remaining 13 minority-dominated provinces are up for grabs. Karroubi won many of these provinces in the 2005 election, but Mousavi’s extensive campaigning seems to be successfully drawing the endorsements of notable minority groups. Mousavi has received significant help from former president Khatami, who is actively campaigning on his behalf in the provinces, effectively enabling Mousavi to cover twice as much ground as Karroubi.
To remain competitive in the provinces, Karroubi must intensify his campaign efforts and focus on specific policies to address their regional needs. But even if he increases his visits and develops clear proposals, Karroubi still must overcome perceptions that he may be a political opportunist and that his promises are just designed to capture the prevailing wind.
Minorities do not expect that either reformist will have the political capital to implement the full range of their promises. However, based upon the experience of the last four years, they do believe their overall condition is likely to be far better under a reformist president than not. As realist voters, minority groups are therefore more likely to support the reformist candidate they believe has the best chance of winning. With Mousavi increasingly being touted as the frontrunner, Karroubi’s chance of retaining minority support is steadily decreasing.
Pictured above: A group of Azeris, who are among the many ethnic minorities living in Iran.
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Published on May 21, 2009
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By Masih Alinejad
As Iranian presidential candidates visit the election department of the Interior Ministry, they pass by the State Security Forces roaming the crowded street. These days, unlike just a short while ago, the moral police do not arrest or harass women who do not adhere to Iran’s strict dress code. This is one of many signs that the elections are on their way in Iran. Young women – with made up faces, tight clothes and hair sticking out from under headscarves – who would normally have no right to appear in public in that fashion, are now viewed as key potential voters.
The Guardian Council has never approved a woman to run for president under its various interpretations of the Islamic Constitution. Therefore, the only way to have a female voice and presence in the executive is for the president to appoint a woman as a cabinet minister. However, no woman has yet been able to sit in cabinet meetings. Former president Mohammad Khatami did invite two women (Masoumeh Ebtekar and Zahra Shojaie) to join his administration as vice presidents, but not as ministers, and their duties concerned mainly environmental and women’s issues. Currently one woman, Fatemeh Javadi, serves as a vice president in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration.
These days, however, the presidential candidates are all promising to appoint women as government ministers. And while the position of “First Lady” is not defined as it is in some other countries, reformist candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi has his wife, Zahra Rahnavard, at his side in campaign rallies and meetings. It is still not customary for couples to join hands on the stage and in public, but the mere presence of his wife on the campaign seems to excite young women and attract many of them to Mousavi’s camp.
Some women political activists believe these acts of “kindness” towards women – by the candidates and by the security forces – will end as soon as the election is over, just as they have in previous election seasons. As Fatemeh Karrubi, the head of the Organization of Iranian Women, said to reformist candidate Mehdi Karroubi during one of his first campaign meetings: “Iranian women are tired of hearing slogans and they ask the next president to deliver executive positions to women.”
Having prominent women in the next president’s administration and cabinet could be beneficial to the women’s movement’s efforts to achieve equal rights. Iranians who suffer from sexual discrimination and unequal rights believe that by entering the political arena and occupying executive and decision-making posts, they would be better positioned to fight unjust laws. Leaders of the “One Million Signatures Campaign” for women’s equal rights, for example, have contacted women members of the parliament – even though women MPs are considered conservative – to stop the parliament from passing legislation allowing men to take a second wife without asking the permission of their first wife. Women went to the Majlis and let the male-dominated institution hear their protest.
Many women leaders are critical of Iranian elections, citing the presence and interference of the Guardian Council. However for the sake of women’s rights, they have no choice but to meet and negotiate with elected officials and their appointees to advocate for their cause. As such, prominent women activists have joined and campaigned for reformist candidates. Jamileh Kadivar, a reformist member of the sixth Majlis who had been rejected as a candidate by the Guardian Council in the past, is now the head of the women’s headquarters for Karroubi’s campaign.
Many traditional women, on the other hand, support Ahmadinejad, including several members of the Majlis. These are the same women who tried to pass legislation shortening the office hours of women, in an attempt to weaken the role of women in the workplace, or who tried to reduce the number of seats reserved for women in colleges and universities. These women have taken steps to reduce and eliminate the role of women in Iranian society, instead of strengthening it. Most of the support among women for Ahmadinejad and his parliamentary faction comes from the rural areas where they are concerned about the Revolution and its goals and values.
Iranian women have become a focus of the presidential candidates, and promises are made to gain their support. The consensus among women, however – especially young women – is that once the election is over, the State Security Forces will once again impose fines and arrest women for violations of dress codes. They fear that the promises of a woman minister will be forgotten and all the sweet talk and hope regarding equal rights will become empty campaign promises.
Iranians will just have to wait and see if women who are highly involved in the campaigns can hold their respective candidates accountable for their promises about women. Women continue to wonder if any of these candidates will, for the first time in contemporary Iranian history, select a woman for a cabinet position – and introduce her to the public before the election.
Pictured above: Two young Iranian women.
Note: This article was translated from Farsi. The opinions expressed reflect those of the author, and not necessarily those of the National Democratic Institute or The Century Foundation.
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Published on May 21, 2009
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“Do not vote for candidates who appeal to flattering the Western countries rather than focusing on the targets and aims of the founder of the Islamic Republic (Ayatollah Khomeini).”
– Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in a speech during a visit to Kurdistan in western Iran, May 18
In a recent televised speech from the Kurdistan province, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei cautioned voters against supporting candidates who might take a more conciliatory approach toward the Islamic Republic’s relations with Western nations. His speech came a day after conservative candidate Mohsen Rezai stated that he would engage in “constructive and effective interaction with the US administration” if elected. Many Iranian analysts believe the Supreme Leader’s statements signal the regime’s support for incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose opponents – both conservative and reformist – have criticized him for his antagonistic approach toward Europe and the United States over issues like Iran’s nuclear program. The Supreme Leader, however, has refrained from making any official endorsements.
Protesting university students expressed their frustration and disappointment over the distribution of some food stamps ahead of the upcoming elections.
– headline on the conservative Tabnak News website, May 18
Students at Tehran University spoke out against the distribution of food stamps among female students in the university’s dorms, claiming it was a political move by the government to gain votes for Ahmadinejad. This was the second time the government had provided the coupons to the students, with the previous distribution described as a Persian New Year gift from the president. The food stamps add to the growing concern among many Iranians that the president is using state resources in an attempt to buy voters’ support. There are allegations that Ahmadinejad has authorized the distribution of food, such as potatoes, and checks worth the equivalent of USD 50.
Mehdi Karroubi has written an open letter to the managing director of the IRIB, in it expressing his concern over what he has called the Radio-TV’s biased approach in addressing the presidential elections’ issues and its candidates.
– headline on the semi-reformist Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA) website, May 19
Following an erroneous report on a widely-watched Iranian evening news program that Mehdi Karroubi had cancelled his campaign trips due to illness, reformist candidate Karroubi wrote a letter of complaint to the director of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). Karroubi, calling for an investigation, accused the official media of censuring him and of being biased in its coverage of presidential candidates. Karroubi is not the first candidate to have called into question the IRIB’s neutrality during the election campaign. Fellow reformist Mir-Hossein Mousavi has been highly critical of the national media, and his wife Zahra Rahnavard, during a speech in Tehran on May 19, said that the IRIB should be ashamed of itself. In an indication that government authorities may be responding to ongoing pressure, it was announced that each candidate would receive 45 hours of air time on state TV and radio and that the Supreme Council for Information and Communication Technology would establish a website for each candidate. It remains to be seen whether these measures will be implemented and whether they will contribute toward leveling the playing field among candidates.
“Any government that comes to work needs to make sure a bill gets passed in the Parliament, granting at least half of the Parliament seats to women.”
– Zahra Rahnavard, wife of reformist candidate Mir-Hossein Moussavi, in a speech delivered to student of Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran, May 19
Bolstering her husband’s credentials on women’s rights, Zahra Rahnavard continues to campaign actively on behalf of Mir-Hossein Mousavi. A well-known figure in her own right, she is quickly becoming an icon for women in this year’s presidential election. At a speech in Tehran, she called upon the future president to provide more opportunities for women and pave the way for women to take a prominent place in the Iranian parliament. Rahnavard served as an advisor to former president Mohammad Khatami and was the chancellor of the all-women Al-Zahra University. She reportedly resigned from her post in 2006 in protest over government policies. She holds a doctorate in political science from Islamic Azad University and is also known in Iran for her poetry and sculpture.
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Published on May 21, 2009
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The candidates certified by the Guardian Council for the 2009 Iranian presidential election are:
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In his successful 2005 presidential campaign, Ahmadinejad took a populist approach, with emphasis on his own simple life. He is a self-described “principlist”, that is, one whose politics are based on Islamic and revolutionary principles. He is known for promising to “put the petroleum income on people’s tables,” referring to distribution of Iran’s oil profits among the poor. Since 2008, he has pushed to remove subsidies from the state budget, which he believes have bloated the system, in exchange for cash distributions to the public.
Ahmadinejad has been the only presidential candidate to characterize relations with the United States and the United Nations as being one-sided and against Muslims. He has defended Iran’s nuclear program and has accused the West of trying to limit Iran’s industrial and technological developments. He supports fighting terrorism in order to improve foreign relations and has called for greater ties with Iran's neighbors by ending visa requirements between states in the region.
He has been known to crack down against women’s attire and activity, homosexuals and minority religious sects. Freedom of expression has been limited in order to further national security.
Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, a senior cleric from Qom, is Ahmadinejad’s ideological mentor and spiritual guide.
Followers of Imam Line and Leadership Front (FILLF) | April 24, 2009
Society of Benefactors of the Islamic Revolution | April 24, 2009
Followers of Islamic Revolution Society | April 25, 2009
Islamic Coalition Party (member of FILLF) | April 26, 2009
Islamic Society of Workers | April 26, 2009
Islamic Revolution Caucus | April 26, 2009
Islamic Society of Engineers | Expected
200 of 290 members of the Iranian parliament
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Karroubi is a critic of the Guardian Council but supports the Supreme Leader. He calls himself a follower of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, as he was an advisor to Khomeini and a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, before he resigned in the belief that non-elected conservative factions were interfering in society. Karroubi considers himself a pragmatic reformist. In his first term as speaker of parliament, he was among the maktabi or “radical” faction of the majlis who contested the policies of President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, such as foreign investment and market reforms. Karroubi sought to promote mass political participation and maintain state control of the economy.
Karroubi differs from Ahmadinejad over almost all domestic issues, especially the management of the economy and the nuclear issue. He embraces all classes within society – students, workers, professionals and the clergy – while operating within the general framework of the constitution of the Iranian Republic. He has stated that he believes that many articles of the constitution pertaining to rights of the people have not been implemented. Karroubi has also stated that he will appoint women as ministers and presidential aides if he wins the June presidential election – a move that would break the barrier women have faced in holding ministerial posts.
During his campaign for the 2005 presidential elections, Karroubi vowed to pay 500,000 rials ($50 dollars) monthly to every Iranian above 18. Since his campaign was announced for the 2009 election, Karroubi has said he will offer shares in Iran’s state oil and gas industry to the public.
Karroubi’s campaign slogan is “Change,” hoping to “bring about change in Iran’s Executive Body.”
National Trust (Etemad-e Melli)
(Karroubi is the chairman of Etemad-e Melli)
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Mousavi has vowed to follow former president Mohammad Khatami’s path not only to pursue democratic reforms, but also to stay true to the country’s Islamic values and the revolution. Mousavi, a former conservative, does not believe in Western-style economic and political reforms. However, he does believe in press and individual freedoms and intends to establish a special dialogue to increase social cohesion. Mousavi believes the society’s mindset must be transformed in order to increase women’s participation in social life. While praising Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s technological and nuclear advancements, he criticizes the current president’s planning and budgeting. He further believes Iran needs to improve human resources and management.
He is widely lauded by Iranians for his management of the economy as prime minister during the Iran-Iraq war. Many believe he can attract principlists and reformers.
Mujahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization (MIRO) | April 10, 2009
Militant Clerics Society | April 11, 2009
Association of Combatant Clerics | April 12, 2009
Solidarity (Hambastegi) | April 15, 2009
Executives of Construction | April 17, 2009
Islamic Iran Participation Party | April 18, 2009
Coordination Council of the Reformist Party | April 18, 2009
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Rezai leads a coalition of pragmatic conservatives, along with Tehran mayor Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf and Ali Akbar Velayati, an advisor to the Supreme Leader. He has been a clear critic of Ahmadinejad, stating that the current president has brought Iran into the “path of destruction.”
His campaign has focused on seven core issues he considers “major threats” to Iran, including unemployment, inflation, poverty, social ills such as drug use, the loss of happiness and peace in society, the weakening of moral values in politics and government, and divisions within the government, ethnic groups and between Shi’a and Sunnis.
He has stated his concern over polarized elections and a self-centered executive branch. His campaign includes the pledge to create an effective coalition government of conservatives and reformists as a major aspect of his reform plan.
Rezai was the chief commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps for 16 years and is currently the secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council. He previously ran for president in 2005, but withdrew his candidacy two days prior to the election.
Development and Justice Party of Islamic Iran | April 15, 2009
The Front of Unity of Islamic Iran | April 27, 2009
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Updated on May 21, 2009
Links:
[1] http://www.accessdemocracy.org/node/15482
[2] mailto:lmiles@ndi.org