By Geneive Abdo
Iran Analyst, The Century Foundation
In the midst of the worldwide furor over Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s speech at the United Nations World Conference Against Racism in Geneva, the international community overlooked the fact that his remarks were not targeted toward a Western audience. They were directed at his Iranian constituency at home and his newfound supporters in some countries in the Middle East, stretching from Egypt to Lebanon. His scripted performance before a crowd vehemently opposed to his views inspired the exact response he desired. Shortly thereafter, Iranians and key groups in the Middle East came to his defense. In solidifying his electoral base in Iran while also expanding his popular support in the region, Ahmadinejad is making a strong case before Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other hard-liners that he should be re-elected in the June presidential poll.
Ahmadinejad, who at the April 20 conference continued his familiar refrain of accusing Israel of being a “totally racist, cruel and oppressive regime” and the West of using the Holocaust as a “pretext” for the Palestinian occupation, is considered a role model not only for Hezbollah and Hamas, but for millions of others in the Arab world who are disenchanted by U.S. and Israeli foreign policies in the region. Ahmadinejad’s regional influence is particularly useful, as he confronts a coalition of leading pragmatic conservatives in Iran who believe his rhetoric has made Iran a pariah in the West and, as a result, are making international relations a key campaign issue in the upcoming presidential election.
Demonstrating their support for Ahmadinejad’s confrontational speech, 200 Iranian parliamentarians in late April issued a statement applauding his performance at the UN conference and condemning the more than 20 foreign representatives who walked out in protest. The United States, Israel and seven other Western governments had already boycotted the event over concerns that Israel would be singled out for condemnation. “A man from the Islamic and revolutionary Iran … has attended the conference and has uncovered the appalling face of modern criminals including the Zionist regime and its supporters. We, as representatives of the Iranian nation in the Majlis, announce our all-out support for the firm and committed stance of our president,” the parliamentarians said in their statement. First Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad-Hassan Abou-Torabi-Fard and Economics Committee Chairman Mesbahi Maghaddam went a step further, saying that foreign governments also support Iran’s position as “justice seeking.”
In the Arab world, popular figures echoed support for the Iranian president. Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem said at a press conference that a large portion of Arab public opinion supports Ahmadinejad’s views. And Hamas media advisor Azam Tamimi told the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) that Ahmadinejad stood out in front of Arab leaders in expressing what every Muslim should be saying about Israel and the Palestinian occupation. Even though many Arabs do not favor Iran’s theocratic state, they believe it stands as a great symbol against Western domination and the Palestinian occupation. Since Ahmadinejad was elected, he has used these issues as trademarks of his presidency to win worldwide attention. In recent weeks before the April 20 speech, he appeared to have toned down his blistering rhetoric, after President Barack Obama expressed a willingness to end 30 years of hostility with Iran. But the UN speech demonstrates that Ahmadinejad believes he benefits politically from his confrontational approach to the outside world, and has no plans to abandon it.
Praise from the parliament, other Iranian government officials and Arab activists stood in stark contrast to the response from Mir-Hossein Mousavi, one of Ahmadinejad’s reformist rivals for the presidency, who called the speech “a disgrace, the scandal of Switzerland.” Mousavi’s views represent those of other prominent reformers, including former President Mohammad Khatami, who have argued that Ahmadinejad’s re-election will cement Iran’s isolation from the international community. While Mousavi agrees with Ahmadinejad on some issues, including Iran’s right to advanced nuclear technology, he disagrees with his hostile rhetoric.
The divide between reformists and the pragmatic conservatives vying against Ahmadinejad and his hard-line supporters reflects not only the fierce internal fighting in Iran over the Islamic republic’s international relationships, particularly with the West, but also Iran’s position in the world. Ahmadinejad and his fellow hard-liners believe Iran should be a regional superpower in the Middle East and that this can be achieved by representing Arab views on foreign policy issues – even at the expense of a possible rapprochement with the United States. In fact, they believe dialogue with the United States and better relations with European governments undermine Iran’s strength in the region. Considering Iran’s growing political power through its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah, its influence in Iraq and within some other Sunni Arab societies, hard-liners believe now is the moment Iran has been waiting for ever since the 1979 revolution.
By contrast, Ahmadinejad’s political foes believe Iran has become too isolated since his election in 2005. They believe Iran should use its new-found strength to rehabilitate the country in the eyes of the West, not only for political gain, but more importantly for economic benefit. Iran is in the throes of the worst economic crisis to hit the country since its war with Iraq in the 1980s. With tougher international sanctions looming as a result of Iran’s commitment to enriching uranium and advancing its nuclear program, reformists and pragmatic conservatives believe better relations with the West could avert further economic penalties.
As the June election draws near, the question is, which view will prevail? Throughout Iran’s post-revolutionary history, political power has shifted more often between hard-liners and pragmatic conservatives than between conservatives and reformers, who rarely have had much influence inside the state structure. Although Ahmadinejad has appeared vulnerable at times to fierce criticism from pragmatic conservatives, his speech at the UN conference is evidence that he believes his hard-line rhetoric will serve him well both inside and outside Iran.
During his 2005 campaign, Ahmadinejad emphasized his desire to inaugurate the “third Islamic revolution” and return the country to a climate of revolutionary fervor. The first revolution came in 1979 when the Shah was ousted and Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran, and the second, he argued, occurred with the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran later that year. During the four years of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, he has encouraged a return to an earlier period of revolutionary ideology within Iran’s domestic and foreign policy agenda. Ahmadinejad’s re-election or defeat will be a signal whether Iran’s core leadership believes in the “third Islamic revolution” or seeks a slightly different path to Iran’s role in the world.
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Published on May 8, 2009
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By Kaveh-Cyrus Sanandaji
Middle East Center, St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford
Divisions in Iranian conservative political ranks formalized this week as Mohsen Rezai announced he will lead a pragmatic-conservative coalition as its presidential candidate in the upcoming June poll. During the 2008 parliamentary elections, fissures emerged in the conservative ranks as elements of the once unified right expressed their discontent with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration and formed the moderate-conservative Grand Principlist Coalition, headed by Rezai, Ali Larijani and Mohammad Bagher-Ghalibaf. The coalition subsequently gained control of the Eighth Majlis in the elections and has since proven to be a staunch and effective opponent of the incumbent President.
The pragmatists’ takeover of the legislature was clearly a move toward their goal of securing the presidency. All three leaders of the coalition competed in previous presidential elections, and as the June 2009 elections approached, they became increasingly more vocal in their criticism of Ahmadinejad’s administration. The relentless attacks led many leading principlists to question the continued viability of Ahmadinejad’s radical, populist-Islamic conservative trend.
Following the Iranian New Year holiday, conservatives engaged in internal politicking on the best strategy to defeat the reformists, leading to a delay in official candidacy announcements. Rather than narrow the rift among conservatives, this period facilitated its expansion as the conflict between Ahmadinejad and the Eighth Majlis became more pronounced. Rumors circulated that the internal negotiations were not going Ahmadinejad’s way, since leading factions like the Combatant Clergy Association had failed to reach a consensus on his candidacy. Rather than dispel these rumors, Ahmadinejad’s media advisor, Ali-Akbar Javanfekr, seemed to confirm them when he announced in mid-April that the President would likely seek re-election as an independent candidate.
During this same period, pragmatic-conservatives announced their intention to present a coalition ticket. With prominent factions abandoning their attempts to forge unity around Ahmadinejad’s candidacy, influential groups such as the Development and Justice Party of Islamic Iran endorsed this alternative approach. Rezai emerged as the candidate best positioned to lead the coalition, given Larijani was firmly entrenched as Speaker of Parliament and Qalibaf was rumored to be seeking a second term as mayor of Tehran.
Rezai’s initial announcement was rejected by the Expediency Discernment Council, but he was able to use his extensive political capital – particularly in the bazaar, clergy, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s inner political circle and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – to successfully lobby for his candidacy. He officially announced his nomination at the end of April. The acceptance of Rezai’s nomination could indicate that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is tacitly permitting the division between moderate and radical conservatives as he gauges where public opinion will swing.
The coalition led by Rezai promotes a pragmatic reform agenda that seeks national reconciliation and economic development through the amelioration of Iran’s foreign relations. Although Rezai was an ardent revolutionary during the formative years of the Republic, he has in recent years presented himself as a competent technocrat. His coalition believes Iran’s managerial model needs revision and many of the economic and development problems can be solved by leveraging various elites’ experiences.
Though specific posts have yet to be determined, Raja News has reported that Ali-Akbar Velayati, the special advisor to the Supreme Leader, and Ghalibaf have accepted to serve as Rezai’s vice presidents. Moreover, Rezai has named Davood Danesh-Jafari – Ahmadinejad’s former economic affairs and finance minister who was dismissed during a cabinet reshuffle presumably over disagreements with the President – as his campaign manager with the likely intention of re-appointing him to the Finance Ministry. But despite Rezai’s declared intention to include reformists in his coalition, none have joined the ticket. With former president Mohammad Khatami and other leading reformists squarely backing Mir-Hossein Mousavi’s candidacy, it seems highly unlikely that Rezai and his conservative camp will be able to attract any reformist politicians.
Though pragmatic conservatives and reformists share a uniform criticism of Ahmadinejad’s failed populist policies, Rezai’s solutions markedly differ from the reformists. While the pragmatists’ agenda is fiscally oriented, it is explicitly linked to the amelioration of foreign relations, which they perceive as a necessary precondition for attracting foreign direct investment, job creation and overall economic growth. In an interview with Press TV in November 2008, Rezai stated that rather than continuing a confrontational stance, it would be mutually beneficial for Iran and the United States to engage one another on issues such as creating regional stability (presumably vis-à-vis Afghanistan and Iraq) and tackling the growing drug-trade problem in Afghanistan.
The pragmatic coalition is also a proponent of structural reforms, particularly concerning factional and electoral politics. On numerous occasions, Rezai has discussed his desire to re-institutionalize political parties as a means of improving the candidate selection process currently dominated by the Ministry of Interior and Guardian Council. To reduce the influence of a few interest groups in presidential and parliamentary election outcomes, Rezai wants to replace the vetting process with a party-driven candidate selection process, similar to the U.S. primary system.
It is still too early to determine how effective Rezai’s proposed agenda will be in attracting voters. However, dissatisfaction with Ahmadinejad’s administration alone will not be enough to secure an outright election victory. Even with Rezai’s extensive political capital among the IRGC, which reportedly gave Ahmadinejad the necessary margin for a second-round victory in 2005, it is unlikely that the IRGC will shift its support entirely to Rezai in the first-round. More realistically, this base will be divided between the two candidates, depriving both of a clear majority.
Although the center-right coalition may pull principlist votes from Ahmadinejad and its economic policies may appeal to fiscally-oriented centrist voters, it is unlikely to attract support from notable reformist leaders or the now re-energized traditional reformist base. If Rezai hopes to achieve a first-round election victory, he must convince middle-class voters (particularly women and youth) and peripheral ethnic minorities of his ability and desire to ameliorate their social conditions. Since announcing his candidacy, Rezai has reached out to ethnic minority and youth voters by, for example, promising to incorporate “ethnicities” into his cabinet and to reduce mandatory military service from two years to one year.
However, it is unclear how much his statements will resonate with these voters, particularly given the reformists’ and Mousavi’s established popularity within these groups. Rezai may also face difficulty in building inroads given the stigma associated with his earlier revolutionary activities as one of the founders and later commander of the IRGC.
In sum, the introduction of a more moderate leaning, principlist is certain to impact the dynamics of the tenth presidential election. Though at this stage it seems the pragmatic coalition is more likely to impact Ahmadinejad than the reformists – by diluting the conservative support base and failing to attract reformist votes – Iran’s electoral politics remain unpredictable. Rezai’s candidacy has the potential to increase overall turnout, prevent any one candidate from securing a first-round victory and force a second-round runoff. Only time will tell, though, how this election drama will play out.
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Published on May 8, 2009
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“We have decided that in order to attain some of our demands and those of women in Iran, we need to form a new coalition. The purpose of the coalition is strictly the presentation of women’s demands and not the specific support or not support of any presidential candidate.”
– statement from the Seminar on the Election Demands of the Women’s Movement
Prominent women activists, journalists, religious leaders and former parliamentarians announced the formation of a new coalition that calls upon the presidential candidates to present specific proposals to ensure the equality of women under the law. Among their demands are that Iran join the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), revise discriminatory legislation and amend the constitution to provide explicitly for gender equality. The coalition’s leaders include prominent women’s activist and presidential candidate Azam Taleghani, although the coalition has no plans to endorse any candidate.
The coalition announcement comes at a time when reformist candidates are increasingly competing for women’s votes. Mehdi Karroubi reiterated last week that the path to greater freedoms for women is through political participation and again promised to appoint women to his cabinet if elected. However, he has refrained from making further commitments, saying that the president has limited authority over many issues, including women’s rights. Karroubi may be wary of making too many promises, as women were disappointed that former president Mohammad Khatami was unable to deliver the full extent of social liberties promised during his campaigns. The other leading reformist candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi has chosen to give his wife Dr. Zahra Rahnavard a prominent place in his campaign. Rahnavard, a former advisor to Khatami, attends all of Mousavi’s campaign events, speaks on policy issues and actively campaigns for her husband. Her active presence on the campaign trail has garnered a lot of positive attention among reformist women in recent weeks.
“If I am elected President, I will reduce the period of mandatory military from two years to one year.”
– conservative presidential candidate Mohsen Rezai quoted in the right-leaning newspaper Tabnak, May 2
“I had great doubts about Mousavi and had to make sure he knew our needs and demands and cared about them as much as Khatami does. I am here today to show my respect for Khatami and his choice as well as my support for Mousavi’s presidency.”
– student attending Mir-Hossein Mousavi’s April 29th rally in Tehran, as quoted in The National, April 30
As Mohsen Rezai hit the campaign trail, the leader of the pragmatic conservative coalition targeted Iranian youth voters, who are viewed as a key electoral demographic for the upcoming elections. The proposal to reduce mandatory military service was aimed at young men, many of whom are reluctant to join the armed forces, and came as a bit of a surprise given Rezai’s 16 years of service to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Despite his overtures, Rezai will have a tough time competing against reformists for youth votes. Earlier in the week, reformist candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi, with former president Mohammad Khatami at his side, spoke to a gathering of several thousand youth. While voters under the age of 30 had expressed initial reservations about Mousavi given his two-decade absence from politics, the strong backing of Khatami has quickly won over this constituency. Mousavi’s campaign statements in support of social freedoms and economic development have particularly resonated with young voters.
President Ahmadinejad Registers for Second Term
– Press TV headline, May 8
Rezai 1st Key Figure to Register for Election
– Press TV headline, May 8
Both incumbent President Ahmadinejad and his conservative competitor Rezai officially registered their candidacies on May 8. The official candidate registration period opened on May 5, with Mohsen Hadi Najafbadi, a 45-year-old man from Sistan Baluchestan, reportedly the first to register. As of Friday, 170 candidates, including 11 women, were formally registered. While the Ministry of Interior reported that more than 1,000 Iranians had registered to run via its website, candidates or their designee must register in person with the Ministry for their candidacy to be official. To be eligible to register, candidates must have a political and religious background; be an Iranian citizen of the Shi’a faith; believe in the principles of the Islamic Republic; and be at least 18 years of age.
The registration period will run through May 9. The Guardian Council will then review the list of candidates and announce on May 20 which are qualified to compete in the election. In 2005, more than 1,000 Iranians registered as candidates, including 89 women; the Guardian Council only approved eight, none of them women.
TV to hold live debates between presidential candidates
– Mehr News Agency headline, May 6
Amid allegations that the state-run Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) television network’s coverage has been biased toward Ahmadinejad’s re-election campaign, the IRIB announced that it would organize and broadcast live television debates among the candidates. Members of parliament have been calling for the IRIB to maintain neutrality during the elections, and Mousavi sent a letter to the head of the IRIB protesting that the network had turned “into a private channel for one of the candidates.” Rezai sent a similar letter to the IRIB, and he and reformist candidate Karroubi had both proposed the IRIB host presidential debates to give the candidates equal airtime and help voters make informed choices. While Mousavi initially opposed holding debates, he has agreed to participate if the other leading presidential contenders agree to a debate. Ahmadinejad has expressed a similar willingness.
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Published on May 8, 2009
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The leading candidates to emerge in the 2009 Iranian presidential election are:
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In his successful 2005 presidential campaign, Ahmadinejad took a populist approach, with emphasis on his own simple life. He is a self-described “principlist”, that is, one whose politics are based on Islamic and revolutionary principles. He is known for promising to “put the petroleum income on people’s tables,” referring to distribution of Iran’s oil profits among the poor. Since 2008, he has pushed to remove subsidies from the state budget, which he believes have bloated the system, in exchange for cash distributions to the public.
Ahmadinejad has been the only presidential candidate to characterize relations with the United States and the United Nations as being one-sided and against Muslims. He has defended Iran’s nuclear program and has accused the West of trying to limit Iran’s industrial and technological developments. He supports fighting terrorism in order to improve foreign relations and has called for greater ties with Iran's neighbors by ending visa requirements between states in the region.
He has been known to crack down against women’s attire and activity, homosexuals and minority religious sects. Freedom of expression has been limited in order to further national security.
Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, a senior cleric from Qom, is Ahmadinejad’s ideological mentor and spiritual guide.
Followers of Imam Line and Leadership Front (FILLF) | April 24, 2009
Society of Benefactors of the Islamic Revolution | April 24, 2009
Followers of Islamic Revolution Society | April 25, 2009
Islamic Coalition Party (member of FILLF) | April 26, 2009
Islamic Society of Workers | April 26, 2009
Islamic Revolution Caucus | April 26, 2009
Islamic Society of Engineers | Expected
200 of 290 members of the Iranian parliament
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Karroubi is a critic of the Guardian Council but supports the Supreme Leader. He calls himself a follower of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, as he was an advisor to Khomeini and a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, before he resigned in the belief that non-elected conservative factions were interfering in society. Karroubi considers himself a pragmatic reformist. In his first term as speaker of parliament, he was among the maktabi or “radical” faction of the majlis who contested the policies of President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, such as foreign investment and market reforms. Karroubi sought to promote mass political participation and maintain state control of the economy.
Karroubi differs from Ahmadinejad over almost all domestic issues, especially the management of the economy and the nuclear issue. He embraces all classes within society – students, workers, professionals and the clergy – while operating within the general framework of the constitution of the Iranian Republic. He has stated that he believes that many articles of the constitution pertaining to rights of the people have not been implemented. Karroubi has also stated that he will appoint women as ministers and presidential aides if he wins the June presidential election – a move that would break the barrier women have faced in holding ministerial posts.
During his campaign for the 2005 presidential elections, Karroubi vowed to pay 500,000 rials ($50 dollars) monthly to every Iranian above 18. Since his campaign was announced for the 2009 election, Karroubi has said he will offer shares in Iran’s state oil and gas industry to the public.
Karroubi’s campaign slogan is “Change,” hoping to “bring about change in Iran’s Executive Body.”
National Trust (Etemad-e Melli)
(Karroubi is the chairman of Etemad-e Melli)
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Mousavi has vowed to follow former president Mohammad Khatami’s path not only to pursue democratic reforms, but also to stay true to the country’s Islamic values and the revolution. Mousavi, a former conservative, does not believe in Western-style economic and political reforms. However, he does believe in press and individual freedoms and intends to establish a special dialogue to increase social cohesion. Mousavi believes the society’s mindset must be transformed in order to increase women’s participation in social life. While praising Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s technological and nuclear advancements, he criticizes the current president’s planning and budgeting. He further believes Iran needs to improve human resources and management.
He is widely lauded by Iranians for his management of the economy as prime minister during the Iran-Iraq war. Many believe he can attract principlists and reformers.
Mujahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization (MIRO) | April 10, 2009
Militant Clerics Society | April 11, 2009
Association of Combatant Clerics | April 12, 2009
Solidarity (Hambastegi) | April 15, 2009
Executives of Construction | April 17, 2009
Islamic Iran Participation Party | April 18, 2009
Coordination Council of the Reformist Party | April 18, 2009
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Rezai leads a coalition of pragmatic conservatives, along with Tehran mayor Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf and Ali Akbar Velayati, an advisor to the Supreme Leader. He has been a clear critic of Ahmadinejad, stating that the current president has brought Iran into the “path of destruction.”
His campaign has focused on seven core issues he considers “major threats” to Iran, including unemployment, inflation, poverty, social ills such as drug use, the loss of happiness and peace in society, the weakening of moral values in politics and government, and divisions within the government, ethnic groups and between Shi’a and Sunnis.
He has stated his concern over polarized elections and a self-centered executive branch. His campaign includes the pledge to create an effective coalition government of conservatives and reformists as a major aspect of his reform plan.
Rezai was the chief commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps for 16 years and is currently the secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council. He previously ran for president in 2005, but withdrew his candidacy two days prior to the election.
Development and Justice Party of Islamic Iran | April 15, 2009
The Front of Unity of Islamic Iran | April 27, 2009
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Other notable candidates in the 2009 Iranian presidential election are:
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Alami, a refomist who served in the 6th and 7th parliaments, believes the relationships between the people and the government should be defined by law. Some see that proposal as contrary to velayat-e fiqh, rule of the Islamic jurist, which serves as the basis for the Iranian constitution.
He has been a strong critic of Ahmadinejad, stating that the president does not act in the national interest or in adherence with people’s rights. He blames Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric for antagonizing the international community and costing Iranians development and prosperity. His campaign has focused on improving the economy by reducing poverty and unemployment, increasing transparency and combating corruption.
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Taleghani is the daughter of Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani – a prominent cleric who was a leader of the resistance movement against the Shah – and a prominent advocate for women’s rights, social justice and democracy in Iran. In 1979, she founded the Women’s Society of the Islamic Revolution and founded the reformist newspaper Payam-e Hajar (The Message of Hajar) to challenge traditional views on women. She is among leaders of a coalition of national religious activists, former lawmakers, journalists, student activists and others who have called for the next president to join the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), repeal discriminatory laws against women and revise articles in the Iranian constitution to include gender equality. Taleghani has also criticized the personal enrichment of the Iranian elite and the widening gap between the rich and poor.
Taleghani served in the 1st parliament, from 1980 to 1984, but was disqualified from running in the 1997 presidential election, 1999 municipal elections and the 2005 presidential elections.
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Updated on May 8, 2009
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Right-Wing Principlists |
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ANNOUNCED |
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad |
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CONSIDERING |
Mohammad Jahromi |
|
CONSIDERING |
Mostafa PourMohammadi |
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Moderate Conservatives |
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ANNOUNCED |
Mohsen Rezai |
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CONSIDERING |
Gholamali Haddad-Adel |
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CONSIDERING |
Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri |
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CONSIDERING |
Mohammad Nahavandian |
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CONSIDERING |
Hassan Rowhani |
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Reformists |
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ANNOUNCED |
Mehdi Karroubi |
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ANNOUNCED |
Mir-Hossein Mousavi |
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ANNOUNCED |
Akbar A’lami |
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ANNOUNCED |
Azam Taleghani |
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Updated on May 8, 2009
Links:
[1] http://www.accessdemocracy.org/node/15449
[2] mailto:lmiles@ndi.org
[3] mailto:lmiles@ndi.org