By Leigh Catherine Miles
Editor, Iran Election Bulletin
Dear Reader,
This week former prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi officially announced that he is running for president and conservative mayor of Tehran Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stopped just short of officially launching his campaign. As the number of high-profile candidates on both sides of the political divide increases, political leaders and voters are faced with tough choices over whom to support. In this issue of the Iran Election Bulletin, Geneive Abdo examines the factions that are dividing conservatives and the emergence of what some are calling a “pragmatic conservative movement.” Iranian journalist Masih Alinejad examines the fault lines within the electorate and raises the question whether there really is choice amid all the candidates. And finally, we examine how all the political maneuvering is playing out in the media – from the right and the left.
I hope you continue to enjoy reading the Iran Election Bulletin, and welcome your comments and questions at lmiles@ndi.org [2].
Sincerely,
Leigh Catherine Miles
Editor
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Published on March 12, 2009
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By Geneive Abdo
Middle East analyst, The Century Foundation
The key political players in Iran’s conservative faction, who have been permanent fixtures since the aftermath of the 1979 Revolution, are often assumed to be interchangeable. Outside observers may question whether there is really a difference between Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ali Larijani, the former nuclear negotiator, or Mohsen Rezai, secretary of the Expediency Council and former commander of the Revolutionary Guards. However, during the presidential campaign underway, the complexities and rivalries among conservative political elites are becoming much more apparent than at any other time in Iran’s post-revolutionary history.
The conservatives – perhaps even more so than the reformers – are having difficulty appearing united as the election draws near. A well-defined faction of pragmatic conservatives has emerged over the last few years that is more moderate than Ahmadinejad and wants to bring Iran out of worldwide isolation. They do not want another Ahmadinejad term and are facing the question of how to counter the incumbent without strengthening the reformists. The election of reformist former-president Mohammad Khatami is still worse in their eyes than another four years of Ahmadinejad, and they risk splitting the conservative faction if they run rival candidates against Ahmadinejad.
However, it seems they are willing to take that risk. In early March, Mohammed Baqer Ghalibaf, the current mayor of Tehran, all but declared his candidacy for president. Ghalibaf presents a stark alternative to the president among conservatives, while still remaining in ideological agreement with other revolutionary elites on core issues, ranging from foreign policy to the economy. Unlike Ahmadinejad, who is 52 years old, Ghalibaf appears significantly younger at 47 and is popular among Iran’s young electorate. He has also built a reputation for concrete action over inflammatory rhetoric, addressing problems from Tehran’s potholes to the capital’s life-threatening pollution.
Despite his differences from Ahmadinejad, Ghalibaf is able to appeal to the same working class voters who have been a constituency solidly behind Ahmadinejad, and one that the conservatives hope to keep on their side. Ghalibaf comes from humble roots – his father was a grocer in the northeastern city of Masshad – which appeals to the underclass. Qalibaf also has demonstrated his revolutionary credentials. As a young military commander, he helped lead the 1982 liberation of Khorramshahr, which had been Iran’s main commercial port city until its capture by the Iraqi army in 1980. The reclamation of Khorramshahr, which is celebrated each year in Iran, is viewed by many Iranian historians as the turning point in the eight-year Iran-Iraq war.
Ghalibaf – and if not him, another like-minded candidate – could solve the conservatives’ problem of running an alternative to Ahmadinejad who would not split the conservative vote in favor of the reformists. He satisfies some of the key concerns of voters and political leaders who normally would support a conservative candidate but are against Ahmadinejad.
Surprisingly, the pros and cons of a serious rival to the president are appearing in public discussion. Amir Mohebbian, an editor of the most influential conservative daily newspaper Resalat, commented on whether conservatives should encourage more than one candidate to run for president. In his analysis, conservatives give Ahmadinejad high marks for his vigorous defense of Iran’s right to a nuclear program and for his bellicose, anti-Israel rhetoric. But according to Mohebbian, conservatives do not approve of the way the president has run the government, particularly Ahmadinejad’s replacement of qualified cabinet members and other government appointments with his personal political cronies.
One of the many important by-products of Ahmadinejad’s tenure has been the emergence of a bloc of pragmatic conservatives, and the divide between pragmatic conservatives and hard-line conservative supporters of Ahmadinejad is growing. Figures such as Larijani, Ghalibaf, Rezai and others believe that Ahmadinejad’s lack of diplomatic finesse – whether over Iran’s nuclear program or its policy toward Israel – has damaged conservatives at home and abroad. They, along with others in Iran’s conservative establishment, want to bring worldwide legitimacy and credibility to the Iranian state. While some are not on the best terms with the United States, they want to appear moderate, compared with Ahmadinejad. They do not recognize the state of Israel, but unlike Ahmadinejad, they would not go as far as to publicly deny the Holocaust. And they do not identify with Third Worldists, such as Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro, and other Trotsky-like icons in the non-aligned movement. They understand the economic and political power of the First World and, while they remain uncompromising on many issues, they believe engagement is in Iran’s economic and political interest.
The pragmatic conservatives also differ with Ahmadinejad in the use of religious rhetoric. They do not invoke Shiite martyrdom by trying to convince Iranians that sacrifice is a religious obligation. They advocate, instead, temporal remedies to fix the crippled economy and encourage better lives on earth for the common man. In contrast, Ahmadinejad has alienated not only many ordinary Iranians, but also much of the clerical establishment by insisting that the Twelfth Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi, whose return on earth at the end of time is eagerly awaited by all Shiites, watches over the day-to-day affairs of the Iranian nation. Invoking such a holy figure for political advantage has offended many in this deeply pious society.
The pragmatists, however, face not only the question of whether presenting more than one candidate will diminish their electoral chances, but they also must contend with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Guardian Council. The 12 Guardians will review all the presidential candidates and then approve a final slate of contenders after candidate registration closes on May 9th. Compared with past election seasons, when the Guardians generally announced their decision in March, the May deadline comes very late. Khamenei, who appoints and wields great influence over the Guardian Council’s decisions, is assumed to prefer Ahmadinejad, but there is mounting doubt.
As political commentator Dr. Alireza Nourizadeh wrote in early March on his website A Week In the News: “If the Supreme Leader feels or gathers that Ahmadinejad is unlikely to win, he would prefer to give Ghalibaf the green light to go ahead so that he would somehow rest assured that the conservatives would have a chance of winning.” The relatively late review of candidates may provide Khamenei more time to assess the conservatives’ election prospects.
Should the conservatives risk splitting alliances within their faction, they will not be alone. As the campaign heats up, reformers supporting presidential candidate Mohammad Khatami are dismayed by the bitter conflict unfolding within their own ranks. Mehdi Karroubi, a former speaker of parliament, has thrown himself into the contest against Khatami and convinced a powerful reformer and former mayor of Tehran Gholam-Hossein Karbaschi to be his campaign manager. In 1997, Karbaschi’s centrist Servants of Construction faction joined forces with Khatami’s campaign. His support gave Khatami vital financial and administrative resources to complement his political base, comprised primarily of students, clerics and seminarians, and brought in votes from a broader segment of Iranian society. He also gave Khatami, then a dark-horse candidate, legitimacy within the political establishment. The defection of Karbaschi to the Karroubi campaign is attracting widespread attention in Iran.
Adding to the internal strife among reformers, former prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi has declared he will run against Khatami. Mousavi, who does not have a strong following among the reformers, has in previous elections hinted at a candidacy but ultimately declined to run. Some conservatives are excited by the prospect of Mousavi as the spoiler. Even though he would unlikely draw a significant number of voters, conservatives believe that the more reformers who enter the race, the more divided they will appear to the electorate. Hassan Rowhani, a powerful hard-line cleric appointed by Khamenei to serve on the Supreme National Security Council, told reporters at a press briefing in March that “[i]t is positive and worthy of praise that a person with such experience as Mousavi, who has many times stood behind others dutifully, should enter the elections and it will be in the interests of the people.”
Factional squabbling aside, many outside observers may question whether it matters who is elected president of Iran, particularly as the last president to challenge the status quo Mohammad Khatami failed to achieve any of his reforms. Indeed, one of the most confusing aspects of Iranian politics is trying to figure out who ultimately runs the state. When Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini led the Islamic revolution in 1979, he established that ultimate religious authority would be given to a single supreme jurist under the valayat-e faqih (rule of the jurisprudent) in opposition to most traditionalist clerics who argued this ignored the sovereignty of the people and opened the way for religious despotism. In 1989, after Khomeini’s death and the appointment of Khamenei as supreme leader, amendments to the Iranian constitution gave Khamenei additional powers. In addition to having ultimate religious authority, he gained control over nearly every aspect and institution of the state from the Revolutionary Guards to the judiciary. Since that time, Khamenei has consolidated his power further, and the Revolutionary Guards have penetrated nearly every aspect of Iranian life.
Related: Iranian balance of power chart | View chart » [3]
Another unusual characteristic of Iranian politics is that, despite their electoral performance, individuals and factions generally retain influence within the Islamic political system whether they win or lose. Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, president from 1989 until 1997, is a prime example of this phenomenon; despite his defeat against Ahmadinejad in 2005, he is clearly one of a handful running the state. Karroubi, who like Rafsanjani has held many government posts, has remained powerful, no matter whether he is inside or outside public office. And even Khatami has continued to be a significant player since he left the presidency in 2005.
So while the election of a president matters, the degree depends upon the constellation of actors also running the country. Where the president does make a difference is in applying pressure to the political system. Both Khatami and Ahmadinejad’s presidencies shook up the establishment, albeit in vastly different ways. Khatami’s supporters, particularly university students, tested the red lines of debate and public dissent, holding demonstrations until they were imprisoned. Ahmadinejad, for his part, has shown there are limits to revolutionary ideology: when his public remarks regarding the Twelfth Imam, Israel, and the United States became too extreme, he was harshly criticized not only by his fellow hardliners in parliament, but also by Ayatollah Khamenei. Whoever is elected president in June, he will have, if no other influence, the power to pull the strings that alter the balance of power in Iran. And depending upon the person, this imbalance could cause either a few tremors or a full-blown earthquake.
Pictured above: Mohammed Baqer Ghalibaf, the current mayor of Tehran.
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Published on March 12, 2009
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By Masih Alinejad
When the seasons change, people around the world think about changing their wardrobe: the most beautiful boots and chicest jacket for fall and winter; hip clothing made with cool, light-weight materials for spring and summer. In Iran, however, the personal choice of clothing is a public matter for the Islamic State – leading to public indecision over what is “appropriate” and available for choice as the seasons change. Personal decisions on hats, boots, short sleeves, etc. can sometimes land violators in short-term detention, and they may be required to provide an official guarantee for their release.
Much like the passing of the yearly seasons, elections seasons in many countries are a time for personal choice and change. People ask each other, “Who are you going to vote for?” By contrast, for the Iranian people election seasons bring the question of which candidates are in “fashion” and whether they have a choice – leading them to ask each other not for whom they will vote, but whether they will vote at all.
As the candidates line up along reformist and conservative lines – former President Mohammad Khatami and former parliament speaker Mehdi Karroubi on the left and current President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, mayor of Tehran Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, former Revolutionary Forces Admiral Mohsen Rezai, and Minister of Labor Mohammad Jahromi on the right – the public is critically observing the excitement. As they watch the elections from the sidelines, the people are dividing into several groups.
The first group comprises people who believe that it will be just as hard to choose a candidate as it is to choose their clothing. They are fed up with the entire political situation and believe that, regardless of who wins the election, change will not come to their lives. This group includes the vast majority of the youth electorate whose primary concerns are freedom to choose their own clothing, music, religion, and drinks and to have free relationships with boys and girls in cafes and clubs. They believe that neither the reformist candidates nor the conservative candidates can secure their beloved freedom by coming to power. This group does not have an official platform in the government and non-governmental media, since their needs are incompatible with the religious laws and regulations of the Islamic Republic. Consequently this group’s opinions only appear in the foreign broadcasting media. Neither reformists nor conservatives mention any support for this group in local media, and it is said that this groups does not even exist.
The second group consists of those who watch the election with skepticism. They criticize the method and process of the election and are hesitant about participating. University students, the labor movement, women rights activists, and civil society activists are among these skeptics who, while they believe in change, also believe that there can be no truly democratic election as long as the Guardian Council retains power over who may run in the election. This group also believes that the military and the Revolutionary Guards influence and threaten the credibility of the election. They see no guarantee that the election will be fair or that their votes will be secure. They voice their criticisms, however, very quietly to avoid the closure of their publications by the government. While their stated position is that they will not participate in the election if a large number of reformists are eliminated by the Guardian Council, as has previously happened, they have never officially declared a boycott of the election.
A third group is formed mostly from the political parties and has numerous representatives from both the reformist and conservative groups. While its members and candidates have begun political tours of various cities and provinces, aggressively pursuing their agendas by organizing meetings and campaigns throughout the country, this group hardly attempts to persuade people to participate in the upcoming election.
Within this group, the reformists’ representatives, unlike their conservative counterparts, face roadblocks. Political campaigns like the “The Third Wave” youth movement are denied meeting space. Candidates like Khatami are not permitted to publish a newspaper, and, as a result, news of their events is not broadcast publicly. Consequently, people in small towns are not aware of their meetings. Given the lack of comprehensive media coverage, it is vital for reformist candidates to engage in face-to-face interactions with people during their provincial trips. Other candidates, like Karroubi, are prevented from making public speeches. In the northern city of Gorgan, university officials where Karroubi was supposed to deliver a speech disagreed with his plan and closed the doors on students. Representatives of the Supreme Leader, Ahmadinejad’s cabinet and the Dean of the school were supposed to issue a special permit, but the permit was never given and Karroubi returned to Tehran.
The final group in the electorate contains individuals who do not have any political affiliation, but will nonetheless go to the polling stations to cast their vote. Some believe that participation in any election is a traditional and religious duty and that participation will demonstrate to the West that Iran is a democratic country that will not allow foreigners to make decisions on its behalf. Others vote to secure a future job, believing that if their records do not show that they voted they may face problems in gaining admission to universities or employment. They mostly fear the “elimination” process in Iran in which applicants for positions in government organizations, entities, and even universities must answer questions about their personal beliefs and behavior, in addition to their educational background and abilities. This is apparently an old fear embedded in a layer of society, which votes without even considering the candidates.
These four groups represent the primary categories and boundaries which divide people in the election season. However, the Iranian people are never predictable and may, as in a soccer match, demonstrate wonders in the final minutes of the match. Thus, undecided opposition groups or groups that do not believe in the election process may very well decide to enter the election scene. Iranians stealthily change their clothing with the seasons, ignoring the moral police’s serious warnings to follow Islamic rules. People may approach their political fashions in the same way.
Note: This article was translated from Farsi. The opinions expressed reflect those of the author, and not necessarily those of the National Democratic Institute or The Century Foundation.
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Published on March 12, 2009
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By Geneive Abdo
Middle East analyst, The Century Foundation
When former prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi publicly pondered a run for president a few months ago, Iranians’ reactions were tempered. Some were skeptical the he would follow through, remembering that he had considered a run for the post in both 1997 and 2005, but never ultimately entered the race. Others thought Mousavi would present himself as a candidate only if his fellow reformers begged him to do so, which, given the candidacies of former president Mohammad Khatami and former speaker of parliament Mehdi Karroubi, seemed unlikely.
On March 10, Mousavi defied the skeptics by announcing that he is definitely running for president – even without pleas from reformist leaders.
During several interviews with the Farsi and English-language press, Mousavi explained his decision by hinting that, after four difficult years of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a radical change is required. “In my opinion, today, more than ever, we should be concerned about social cohesion,” he said. “The same reasons and factors that made me avoid running in previous elections have convinced me that this time is different, and I need to run,” he said, without providing further details.
Mousavi’s candidacy may make it more difficult for the reformers to win. Their leading man, Mohammad Khatami, entered the race in February, and fellow reformer Mehdi Karroubi also is a contender. If the Guardian Council, the body that decides the final slate of candidates, authorizes all three to run, the reformers’ power base will be split.
This has been a long-standing fear within the reformist faction. Appearing divided in the eyes of the electorate will be a gift for their conservative rivals. In January, Khatami vowed to withdraw if Mousavi became a candidate. But after all the fanfare over Khatami’s campaign – especially in the West, where he is most popular – it will be difficult now for the former president to end his candidacy.
Mousavi offers different assets than Khatami. Although he is little known in the West, he is more popular than Khatami among traditionalists and hard-liners, who admire his performance as prime minister from 1981-1989 during the brutal Iran-Iraq war and who agree with his anti-Western and anti-American rhetoric.
The reformist faction is likely either to pressure one of the three candidates to withdraw or wait for the Guardian Council to decide the matter for them. In May, the Guardians will announce who will be allowed to stand in the June election.
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Published on March 12, 2009
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“Karroubi and Karbaschi appear as one”
– headline in the reformist Etemad-e-Melli newspaper, March 4
Mehdi Karroubi, reformist candidate for president and Secretary General of the National Confidence Party, appointed Gholam-Hossein Karbaschi as his campaign manager. Karbaschi, who is the Secretary General of the Servants of Construction Party (Kargozaran), joined the Karroubi campaign despite an official announcement from the Kargozaran party – allied with Hashemi Rafsanjani – that it will support Mohammad Khatami in the election. This lack of strict party loyalty is not unusual in Iran, but is stirring frustration and anger among reformists already concerned about a split within their ranks. In another twist, despite joining Karroubi, Karbaschi has still not ruled out his own presidential run.
“Some movements and groups are trying hard to prevent the reformists from getting their voice heard.”
– former president and current candidate Mohammad Khatami in the reformist newspaper Aftab-e Yazd, March 9
Khatami expressed concern over the tight control the government exerts over the reformist press and the consequent fear the reformist media has about criticizing the current administration or conservative groups. He further complained that the narrow space for reformist media limits his ability to present himself and his ideas to the Iranian people. While some candidates have their own publications, Khatami lacks the resources to create his own newspaper.
“Even Khatami himself does not believe in what his reformist government did for the country in eight years!”
– headline in the conservative newspaper Keyhan, March 9
Conservatives seized upon a speech that Mohammad Khatami gave in Bushehr province, in which he criticized the lack of government action since the end of the Iran-Iraq war to address poverty in the province. The conservatives have portrayed his statements as an admission that while president Khatami achieved little for the country.
“Government managers do not have the right to prevent the presidential candidates from giving speeches in government buildings and locations.”
– President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on the conservative Jam-e-Jam website, March 9
In the last 10 days, reformist presidential candidates Mohammad Khatami and Mehdi Karroubi have both been prevented from giving lectures at public university campuses. In a surprise move, President Ahmadinejad responded by stating that no one has the authority to prevent candidates from expressing themselves freely in any public environment.
“We are committed to holding free and fair elections.”
– Interior Minister Sadegh Mahsouli in the conservative Resalat newspaper, March 9
The Minister of Interior, within whose ministry the elections department is housed, emphasized the need to put hostilities aside and abide by election laws and regulations. Earlier in the week the ministry announced that the registration period for candidates would begin on May 5th and run through May 9th. The election headquarters within the ministry will open in the middle of this month.
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Published on March 12, 2009
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The leading candidates to emerge in the 2009 Iranian presidential election are:
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In his successful 2005 presidential campaign, Ahmadinejad took a populist approach, with emphasis on his own simple life. He is a self-described “principlist”, that is, one whose politics are based on Islamic and revolutionary principles. He is known for promising to “put the petroleum income on people’s tables,” referring to distribution of Iran’s oil profits among the poor. Since 2008, he has pushed to remove subsidies from the state budget, which he believes have bloated the system, in exchange for cash distributions to the public.
Ahmadinejad has been the only presidential candidate to characterize relations with the United States and the United Nations as being one-sided and against Muslims. He has defended Iran’s nuclear program and has accused the West of trying to limit Iran’s industrial and technological developments. He supports fighting terrorism in order to improve foreign relations and has called for greater ties with Iran's neighbors by ending visa requirements between states in the region.
He has been known to crackdown against women’s attire and activity, homosexuals and minority religious sects. Freedom of expression has been limited in order to further national security.
Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, a senior cleric from Qom, is Ahmadinejad’s ideological mentor and spiritual guide.
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Karroubi is a critic of the Guardian Council but supports the Supreme Leader. He calls himself a follower of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, as he was an advisor to Khomeini and a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, before he resigned in the belief that non-elected conservative factions were interfering in society. Karroubi considers himself a pragmatic reformist. In his first term as speaker of parliament, he was among the maktabi or “radical” faction of the majlis who contested the policies of President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, such as foreign investment and market reforms. Karroubi sought to promote mass political participation and maintain state control of the economy.
Karroubi differs from Ahmadinejad over almost all domestic issues, especially the management of the economy and the nuclear issue. He embraces all classes within society – students, workers, professionals and the clergy – while operating within the general framework of the constitution of the Iranian Republic. He has stated that he believes that many articles of the constitution pertaining to rights of the people have not been implemented. Karroubi has also stated that he will appoint women as ministers and presidential aides if he wins the June presidential election – a move that would break the barrier women have faced in holding ministerial posts.
During his campaign for the 2005 presidential elections, Karroubi vowed to pay 500,000 rials ($50 dollars) monthly to every Iranian above 18. Since his campaign was announced for the 2009 election, Karroubi has said he will offer shares in Iran’s state oil and gas industry to the public.
Karroubi’s campaign slogan is “Change”, hoping to “bring about change in Iran’s Executive Body”.
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Mousavi has vowed to follow former president Mohammad Khatami’s path not only to pursue democratic reforms, but also to stay true to the country’s Islamic values and the revolution. Mousavi, a former conservative, does not believe in Western-style economic and political reforms. However, he does believe in press and individual freedoms and intends to establish a special dialogue to increase social cohesion. Mousavi believes the society’s mindset must be transformed in order to increase women’s participation in social life. While praising the technological and nuclear advancements, he criticizes current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s planning and budgeting. He further believes Iran needs to improve human resources and management. He is widely lauded by Iranians for his management of the economy as prime minister during the Iran-Iraq war. Many believe he can attract principlists and reformers.
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Published on March 27, 2009
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|
Right-Wing Principlists |
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|
ANNOUNCED |
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad |
|
ANNOUNCED |
Mohammad Jahromi |
|
ANNOUNCED |
Mostafa PourMohammadi |
|
Moderate Conservatives |
|
|
ANNOUNCED |
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf |
|
CONSIDERING |
Mohsen Rezai |
|
CONSIDERING |
Gholamali Haddad-Adel |
|
CONSIDERING |
Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri |
|
CONSIDERING |
Mohammad Nahavandian |
|
NOT RUNNING |
Ali Akbar Velayati |
|
Reformists |
|
|
ANNOUNCED |
Mohammad Khatami |
|
ANNOUNCED |
Mohammad-Reza Aref |
|
ANNOUNCED |
Mehdi Karroubi |
|
ANNOUNCED |
Mir-Hossein Mousavi |
|
CONSIDERING |
Hassan Rowhani |
|
CONSIDERING |
Mohamad-Ali Najafi |
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Published on Feb. 26, 2009
Links:
[1] http://www.accessdemocracy.org/node/15436
[2] mailto:lmiles@ndi.org
[3] http://www.accessdemocracy.org/files/images/Iran_2009Mar_PowerDiagram.jpg